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Postwar Behavior of Savings Bond Holders
Preceding chapters were concerned with the basic, distinguishing
characteristics of savings bonds and with the distribution of savings
bond holdings among individuals and other investors. The purpose
of the present chapter is to describe the behavior of savings bond holders
during the postwar period and to indicate the economic and financial
forces underlying variations in sales and redemptions. This chapter deals
with three main subjects: (1) the reduced importance of savings bonds
in individuals' financial saving relative to the prewar and the World
War II periods, (2) short-run variations in sales and redemptions dur-
ing the postwar period, and (3) the turnover of savings bond holdings.
The postwar record of sales and redemptions is significant in
several respects. Since savings bonds have been an important element
in individuals' financial saving, analysis of the determinants of the
behavior of holders of these bonds may contribute to understanding of
broader aspects of the investment behavior of individuals. More specific
to the purpose of this paper, however, is the significance of the postwar
record of sales and redemptions from the standpoint of federal debt
management. Since savings bond holdings constitute a large accumu-
lation of near-demand claims, the analysis of the behavior of holders
—particularly their responsiveness to economic change and sensitivity
to interest rate relationships—is basic to the appraisal of the role of the
program in federal debt management. The postwar record of behavior
also provides an essential factual basis for the study of broader aspects
of debt management, including the significance for the Treasury of bor-
rowing directly from the mass of individual savers. The role of the
program in postwar debt management is discussed in the last chapter,
which utilizes findings on savings bond behavior developed here.
47POSTWAR POSITIONOF SAVINGS
IN INDIVIDUALS' FINANCIAL SAVING
In the perspective of the quarter-century history of the savings bond
program, the most striking aspect of the postwar record is the sharply
diminished relative position of these bonds in individuals' financial
saving. Although postwar additions to savings bond holdings represented
a significant proportion of financial saving, particularly during the early.
years following the end of World War II, their relative importance in
the total was markedly smaller than in preceding periods. This shift
reflected basic changes in the environment in which the program has
operated.
The slight $700 million decrease in the amount of savings bonds
outstanding during the fifteen-year period from 1946 to 1960 contrasted
sharply with the $45.0 billion rise during 1941-45, and, indeed, with
the $8.2 billion rise from the inception of the program to the end of
1940.1 The small postwar decline reflected the combined effects of the
$8.0 billion excess of redemptions over sales, which tended to reduce
the amount of savings bonds outstanding, and $7.3 billion of net accrued
interest, which tended to increase outstandings.2 According to Treasury
estimates, individuals (including partnerships and personal trust ac-
counts) increased their holdings by $2.7 billion, while other investors
reduced theirs by $3.4 billion.
The decline in additions to savings •bond holdings after World
War II reflected partly the decline in the general level of personal saving
from extraordinary wartime levels, accompanying the expansion in
the supply of consumer goods, previously unavailable, and other eco-
nomic changes. More significantly, it resulted from a massive shift in
the composition of saving in favor of other media, as shown by data
I Data on outstandings are based on the current redemption value of discount bonds
(Series A through F and J) and the par value of current-income bonds (Series G,
H, and K), and exclude savings stamps. All data on sales, redemptions, and amounts
outstanding of savings, bonds are derived from Annual Report, Treasury, and
Treasury Bulletin.
2Salesand redemptions are measured in terms of sales price. The annual amount
of net accrued interest equals the interest accrued on outstanding bonds less the
accrued interest portion of the value of bonds redeemed during the year.
48on saving for the period 1935-58 in Table This shift is evident not
only when additions to individuals' holdings are compared with gross
financial saving, but also when they are compared with additions to
savings accounts, assets closely similar in terms of safety, liquidity, and
convenience to the saver. The decline in the relative position of savings
bonds in individuals' saving was most pronounced after 1950, and for
series other than E and H.
The diminished importance of savings bonds in individuals' finan-
cial saving may be attributed to a number of factors. It reflected partly
the disappearance or weakening of temporary wartime stimulants that
had enabled the program to capture an unusually large share of total
saving during 1941-45, including massive bond drives, wartime pa-
triotism, and widespread purchases on a semicontractual basis through
payroll deductions. Moreover, continued growth of savings bond hold-
ings on the wartime scale would not have been in accord with the
Treasury's greatly reduced financing requirements.
Another major' influence was the decline in the relative attractive-
ness of savings bonds to investors, due to the rise in yields on alternative
media during the 1950's.
A third important influence was increasingly aggressive competi-
tion from private financial institutions during the postwar period, re-
fleoted not only in rising rates of return on savings accounts but also
in the increased use of advertising, "giveaways," and other promotional
activity. By contrast, promotional activity on behalf of the savings bond
program has been less aggressive during the postwar period than during
the war years.
Another possible factor underlying the shift to other types of assets
may have been changes in individuals' investment preferences, resulting
in an upgrading of deposits and shares in private financial intermedi-
aries. Much of the growth of the savings bond program in the prewar
and World War II periods probably reflected a shift to savings media of
unquestioned safety in reaction to the financial crisis of the early 1930's.
Postwar prosperity and the evident soundness of private financial in-
stitutions together with federal insurance of deposits and share
may have increased the relative attractiveness of private institutions as
media for saving.
Finally, the maturing of bonds sold during World War II and
discontinuation of some series were additional factors underlying the
3NBERestimates of nonfarm households' saving for 1946-58 in Table 11 are not
fully comparable with estimates made by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and included in the table for years prior to 1948. However, differences between
the two series with respect to the share of savings bonds in financial saving are
fairly small.
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Net change in savings
bonds outstandinga
Total $3.2 $45.0 $10.0 —$6.4 $ 3.7
E and H 30.7 8.8 8.1 11.9
Share of savings bonds in
gross financial savingb
Total 10% 26% 8% —1% 1%
EandH 20 4 3 8
Share of savings bonds innet
changes in fixed-value,
redeemable claimsc
Total 39% 63% 27% —5% 4%
EandH 47 16 9 11
SouRcE:National Bureau of Economic Research, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, and Treasury Department.
NOTE: Share of savings bonds computed from NBER estimates of saving by non-
farm households, 1946-58, and data on individuals' saving from Securities
and Exchange Commission, 1935-45. Data for are not strictly
comparable with earlier years. Estimates of nonfarm households' holdings
of E and H bonds are based on the assumption that the ratio of E and H
bonds to total savings bonds in holdings of nonfarm households is equivalent
to the corresponding ratio for individuals, partnerships, and personal trust
accounts. Data on savings bonds include net accrued interest.
aNetchange in total savings bonds and E and H bonds outstanding, including
holdings of individuals and all other investors.
bNetchange in savings bonds held by individuals as percentage of gross financial
saving (net acquisitions of financial assets, excluding changes in indebtedness).
Net change in savings bonds held by individuals as percentage of change in
individuals' holdings of fixed-value, redeemable claims —savingsdeposits in
commercial and mutual savings banks, postal savings, shares in credit unions
and savings and loan associations, and savings bonds.
50decline in the relative position of savings bonds, particularly in the
1950's. In brief, the diminished postwar importance of savings bonds in
individuals' financial saving relative to earlier periods reflects deep-
seated economic, financial, and psychological changes, as well as factors
specific to the program.
PosrwAJt FLUCTUATIONS IN SAVINGS FLOWS
Within the span of the fifteen years after the end of World War II,
sharp fluctuations occurred in the flow of funds channeled into the
savings bond program. When total savings bond flows are broken down
into component flows, it is evident that pattern's of movement of the
various series have differed markedly. It is important to bear in mind
this diversity of movement in appraising the faotors underlying savings
bond behavior.
For the purpose of analyzing changes in total and in component
flows, appropriate measures are sales, redemptions, and net sales (sales
less redemptions) taken in terms of sales prices of bonds sold or re-
deemed, excluding the net amount of interest accrued on bonds sold
at discount. Changes in the annual amount of net accrued interest stem
mainly from technical factors. Although the accrual of interest has been
an important factor in the growth of savings bond holdings (Table A-2),
it is excluded throughout most of the following discussion because it
tends to obscure the response of savings bond flows to economic and
financial forces.4
As Chart 4 shows, annual net sales of savings bonds underwent a
sweeping decline during the postwar period. In each year from 1946 to
1950, net sales were positive, as sales exceeded redemptions, amounting
to $7.3 billion for the entire five-year period. In 1951, net sales turned
negative, as sales dropped below redemptions, and remained negative
thereafter. During 1951-60 net sales amounted to $ —15.3billion.
4Annualvariations in net accrued interest reflect mainly changes in the amount
and age of outstanding bonds, changes in the volume and age of redeemed bonds,
and the structure .of interest rates on current and past issues of savings bonds. An
alternative measure of net sales is the excess of sales over the total dollar amount
of redemptions, including both the aggregate sales price and the accrued interest
portion of the value of redeemed bonds. If this measure were used, redemptions
would be greater relative to sales than is indicated in. this paper, and net sales
would be smaller, but patterns of year-to-year movements of savings bond flows
would not greatly.
51CHART 4
Net Sales of Savings Bonds, 1945-60
SouRcE: Data are sales less redemptions, in terms of sales price, derived from
Treasury Department figures. Accrued interest is excluded. Data reflect redemptions
of matured bonds, including exchanges• for marketable Treasury securities (see note
to Table A-4), and redemptions of unmatured bonds.
Superimposed on this broad decline were marked short-period
fluctuations. Net sales dropped precipitously in 1946, 1950-51, 1956-57,
and 1959. Each of these reductions reflected rapid changes in economic
and financial conditions. Net sales also declined from 1948 to 1949,
mainly because 1948 sales were swelled by a special offering of F and
52C bonds to institutional investoñ.5 During intervening periods and in
1960 net sales increased, but not enough to offset these reductions.
Differences Among Series
In analyzing fluctuations in savings bond flows, a distinction should
be drawn between Series E and H bonds, on the one hand, and Series F,
C, J, and K bonds, on the other.6 While E and H bonds were sold
exclusively to "natural persons" throughout most of the period covered
by this paper, F, C, J, and K bonds were available to and were bought
in significant amounts by nonindividual investors. E- and H-bond flows,
therefore, have been influenced more directly by changes in the general
level of personal saving than flows of other series. Furthermore, buyers
of E and H bonds probably have a greater preference for investments
free of risk and are less likely to shift to marketable securities in response
to any given differential in yields. Finally, because of their higher yields,
E and H bonds were less vulnerable to increases, in yields on competi-
tive investments during the 1950's than F, C, .J, and' K bonds. -
Theinfluence of changes in the general level of saving on E- and
H-bond flows is reflected in the concurrent sharp declines at the end
of World War II in personal• saving and net sales of E bonds (Chart 5).
Similarly, the sudden drop in personal saving during the consumer
buying spree following the outbreak of the Korean War, in mid-1950,
was reflected in a pronounced decline in net sales of E bonds. In this
instance, however, the similarity of movement is obscured in the annual
data by the subsequent more rapid recovery of total saving than of E
bonds. As a result, the general rise in saving during the early 1950's was
reflected by increased net sales of E and H bonds only after a sub.
stantial lag.
In addition to fluctuations in the general level of saving, changes
in the relative attractiveness of savings bonds and other savings media
have had an important influence on E- and H-bond flows. This is
5InJune 1948, financial institutions other than commercial banks were permitted
to purchase F and C bonds in amounts exceeding prevailing limits on annual
purchases, and commercial banks were also permitted to purchase limited amounts
of these bonds. The Treasury sold over $1 billion of F and C bonds to all investors
in that month. Another special offering of F and ,G bonds occurred during the
last three months of 1950, when the Treasury sold $930 million of F and G bonds
to institutional investors under terms similar to those adopted in 1948.
6Inaddition to activity in these bonds, investors liquidated prewar A-D bonds,
mainly during the period from 1946 to 1951. The total amount of AD bonds
















Net Sales of Savings Bonds
'48'49'50'51'52'53'54'55'56'57'58'59'60NOTE TO CHART 5
Gross financial saving refers to net acquisitions of financial assets, excluding
changes in indebtedness; data are NBER estimates for nonfarm households,
1948-58, and Securities and Exchange Commission figures for individuals, 1945
and 1946. NBER estimates for 1959 and 1960 are not available. Data on savings
accounts include savings and time deposits in commercial and mutual savings
banks, postal savings, and shares in savings and loan associations and credit unions;
they are compiled from Federal Reserve figures, 1946-60, and SEC data, 1945
and 1946. Figures on personal saving are from the Department of Commerce. Net
sales of savings bonds refer to the excess of sales over redemptions in terms of
sales price, and exclude accrued interest. They are computed from Treasury
Department figures (see also notes to Charts 4 and 6 and Table 11).
indicated by differences in direotion between changes in net sales of
E and H bonds and total saving.
Net sales of F, C, J, and K bonds, by contrast, have not been
strongly influenced by changes in the level of saving. They declined at
the end of World War II, but much more moderately than net sales
of E and H bonds, and rose in 1948 and 1950 because of special offer-
ings to institutional investors. While total saving rose during the 1950's,
net sales of F, G, J, and K bonds declined markedly and were negative
throughout the 1951-60 period, even before the first bonds in this group
reached maturity in 1953 and before sales of new bonds were dis-
continued in 1957.
Just as there have been differences in the behavior of the various
series, so also have there been differences in the behavior of small- and
large-denomination E bonds. As indicated by Chart 5, net sales of
$10-$100 E bonds have been negative throughout the postwar period,
with the exception of 1956, while net sales of larger denominations
generally have been positive.7 Except during the period of transition
at the end of World War II, net sales of $10-$100 E bonds have varied
over a narrower range than those of larger denominations. The relative
stability of net sales of small-denomination E bonds probably stems
from regular purchases through 'the payroll savings plan and the lesser
sensitivity to capital market changes of small, unsophisticated investors.
7 The division of E- and H-bond flows into classes by denomination necessarily is
partly arbitrary. However, examination of sales and redemptions data for the
various denominations suggests that groupings of denominations other than those
used in this chapter would not result in significantly different conclusions. Differ-
ences in behavior between large and small denominations are evident in F-, C-, J-,
and IC-bond flows, but are not discussed here because dollar amounts of sales and
redemptions of these series are dominated by large denominations, particularly
$1,000 and $10,000 bonds.
55Differences in Behavior of Sales and Redemptions
Diversity of behavior is also evident when net bond flows are
broken down into their underlying gross flows of sales and redemptions.
Sales have generally varied inversely to redemptions, as might be
expected, but at times both moved in the same direction (Chart 6).
Although much attention has been focused on the possibility of cash
drains on the Treasury resulting from redemptions, reductions in sates
of new bonds often have been as important a cause of declines in the
net flow of funds into the program as increases in redemptions.
Differences in the responsiveness of sales and redemptions to
economic and capital market changes partly reflect interest "penalty"
features, which tend to discourage investors from liquidating savings
bonds prior to maturity. Because of these features, investors may respond
to increases in yields on other investments by reducing their purchases
of new bonds, but 'may continue to maintain their existing holdings
intact. Some investors may also have continued to hold E bonds in order
to postpone further the payment of federal income tax on accrued
interest,, while at the same time they may have preferred to channel
new saving into other media.
In any event, it is clear that not only, 'the ability of investors to
liquidate their holdings at will but also the, varying ability of the
Treasury to sell fixed-yield savings bonds under changing economic
and capital market conditions have been major factors responsible
for postwar. variations' in the net flow of funds into the program.
Periods of Declining Net Sales
Periods of major reductions in the flow of funds into the program
are Of particular significance in appraisingrole of savings bonds
in federal debt management. Net outflows of funds resulting from
excesses of redemptions over sales may exert unexpected drains on the
Treasury's cash position. The behavior of savings bond holders during
these periods provides an indication of the nature of the problems posed
for the Treasury by the existence of a large amount of redeemable claims
in the hands of individual investors.
As indicated earlier, the record of postwar savings bond flows has
been dominated by sharp reductions in net sales—the sweeping decline
from positive amounts during the early postwar years to negative
amounts during most of 'the 1950's, and short-run reductions at the end
of World War II, during the Korean War, and during periods .of capital
56CHART 6
Sales and Redemptions of Savings Bonds, 1945-60
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INOTE TO CHART 6
Figures were computed from Treasury data. They are in terms
of sales price and exclude accrued interest. Redemptions include both matured
and unmatured bonds. Figures on total savings bonds include redemptions of
prewar A-D bonds. H bonds, first offered to public in 1952, are included
with E bonds beginning in June 1952. J and K bonds replaced F and C bonds in
new offerings in May 1952; redemptions in 1952-60 include F and G bonds. Sales
of new J and K bonds were terminated in 1957. Data. on $10-$100E and$200
and higher-denomination E and H bonds are derived from figures on sales and
redemptions of the various denominations, by number of pieces. The lowest de-
nomination H bond is $500. See note to Chart 4.
market stringency in 1956-57 and 1959. Each case is unique in a number
of respects, reflecting différencés among the various periods in the
influential forces underlying savings bond behavior.
The marked decline in net sales from 1946-50 to 1951-60 was
concentrated in Series .F,. C, J, and K bonds (Table 12), and was due
initially to the reduced attractiveness of these bonds relative to market-
able securities in the period since the Federal Reserve—Treasury accord.
By contrast, average net sales of E and H bonds were higher during
1951-60 than in previous postwar years. As indicated earlier, the turn-
about in total net sales stemmed partly from a decline in sales of new
bonds and partly from an increase in maturities. The reduced attractive-
ness of F, C, J, and K bonds, therefore, was complicated by a refinancing
problem—the unwiilingñess.of many investors who purchased F and C
bonds during World War II to replace maturing bonds with new ones,
given the yield relationships that prevailed during most of the period
since the accord. Holders of matured F and G bonds (except for com-
mercial bank holders) could invest the proceeds in new J and K bonds
prior to May 1957 and late in 1958 were granted the privilege of shifting
to new E and H bonds without regard to the annual limitations on
purchases of the latter series. However, under prevailing capital market
conditions, savings bonds were not safficiently attractive to these and
to other investors so that new sales fell well below the increased level
of total redemptions. Exchanges of .F and C bonds for marketable
securities in three separate offerings in 1953, 1959, and 1960 (which
are included with redemptions of matured bonds in redemption data)
and discontinuation of sales of new J and K bonds in 1957 further
reduced total net sales of F, C, J, and K bonds.
The precipitous decline of $6.3 billion in net sales from $7.5 billion
in 1945 to $1.2 billion in 1946, by contrast, was due to radically different
influences—the general decline in personal savings at the end of World
58'TABLE
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(annual rates) 1945-46 1949-51 1955-57 1958-59
Decline in total net sales 3.0 8.3 2.3 3.9 1.7
Decline in sales .1.8 .5.5 1.9 1.7 .4
Increase, in redemptions 1.2, 0.8 0.4. 2.2 1.3
Unmatured bondsa —0.8 0.8 . 0.7 1.5 0.7
Matured bondsa 2.5 0.1 '—0.1 —0.1 1.3
Unclassifieda b b 0.9
Decline in total net sales '3.0 6.3 2.3 3.9 1.7
A-D . "—0.5 0.1 —0.2' b b.
Eand H . —0.2 5.8 .1.4 1.6 0.9
$10-$100 E —0.7 4.2
. b 0.1 .0.1
$200 and higher
denomination E and H 0.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 0.8
F,G,J, and K 3.6' '0.4 1.1 2.3 0.8
SouRcE: Computed from data in Treasury Bulletin.
NOTE;Positive figures indicate reductions in sales ,and increases in redemptions; negative
figures represent increases in sales and reductions in redemptions. For the prior
to 1950, redemptions of matured bonds are assumed to be equivalent to total redemptions
of A-D bonds. As indicated in the note to Table A-4, figures on redemptions of matured
bonds include exchanges. See also note to Chart 8.
a Breakdown of redemptions includes accrued interest.
b Less than $500 million.
WarII.and the special problems, already indicated, which the savings
bond program faced in adjusting to peacetime conditions.
bonds responded more sensitively to the general decline
in saving at the end of World War II than did other media: the relative
importance of net changes in individuals' holdings of savings bonds
dropped from 17 per cent of gross financial saving and 41 per cent of
net additions to fixed-value, redeemable claims in 1945 to 5 per cent and
'5913 per cent, respectively, in 1946.8Asshown by Table 12, the decline
was due largely to falling sales, mainly in small-denomination E bonds,
which accompanied a drastic decline in membership in the payroll
savings plan, from 25 million at mid-1945 to 7.5 million at mid-1946.9
Reduced participation in the plan probably resulted partly from the
withdrawal of persons who had joined during the war for patriotic
reasons or under social pressure. Factory shutdowns and movement of
labor stemming from demobilization probably also caused withdrawals
from the plan.
Rapid changes in savings bond flows during the Korean War period
were produced by still another set of circumstances. The $2.3 billion
reduction in net sales from 1949 to 1951 was triggered by scare buying
by consumers, but was aggravated and prolonged by capital market
developments that adversely affected the savings bond program. Net
sales dropped from $1.1 billion to $ —1.2billion, largely owing to
falling sales. The decline was concentrated in Series F and C bonds
and in large-denomination E bonds. Perhaps surprisingly, small-denom-
ination E bonds were less strongly affected, reflecting expansion in the
number of participants in the payroll savings plan—from 5 million at
mid-1950 to 5.8 million at mid-1951 and, further, to 7.5 million at
mid-1952.'°
Expecting shortages of consumer goods, consumers responded to
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and to subsequent events by marked-
ly increasing their purchases of goods, particularly durables, in the thfrd
quarter of 1950 and the first quarter of 1951." The effects of these waves
of scare buying on total personal saving and net sales of E bonds are
reflected in Table 13. Other media for liquid saving were also affected
as indicated by the slight decline in net additions to savings accounts in
1950 (Chart 5).
While increased consumer spending was the initiating factor under-
lying the decline in net sales during this period, shifts in the composition
of saving in response to rapid capital market changes and expectations
of inflation apparently also played an important part. Net sales of savings
bonds continued to decline after other savings media had recovered
from the effects of the consumer spending rise. Although net sales
8Dataare based on estimates compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
For types of savings media included, see notes to Table 11.
9AnnualReport, Treasury, 1946, P. 47.
10AnnualReport, Treasury, 1951, p. 145, and 1952, p. 191.
11SeeBert G. Hickman, The Korean War and United States Economic Activity,
1950-52 (Occasional Paper 49, New York, NBER, 1955), for a detailed analysis
of economic changes during this period.
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CONSUMEREXPENDITURES, PERSONAL SAVING, AND
OF E 1950 1951













I 0.72 185.7 26.8 15.2















II —0.45 205.5 28.0 20.9
III •—0.24 208.8 28.5 20.7
IV —0.12 213.4 28.4 20.4
NOTE: Data on net sales are in terms of sales price, excluding net accrued interest.
They are based on monthly sales and redemption figures from Treasury
Bulletin, adjusted by NBER for seasonal Data on personal con-
sumption expenditures and personal saving are from United States Income
and Output, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, Dept. of
Commerce, November 1958, pp. 147 and 153.
declined further in 1951 from the already low level of 1950, gross
financial saving increased significantly on an annual basis in 1950, and
declined only slightly in 1951. The shift to alternative media was con-
centrated mainly in additions to holdings of savings deposits and shares,
which had dropped sharply during the early stages of the Korean War,
but nearly doubled between 1950 and 1951. The Survey of Consumer
Finances reported that, among individuals who were asked to state their
investment preferences, the proportion expressing a preference for sav-
ings bonds and savings accounts decreased between early -1949 and
early 1951, while the percentage favoring common stock and real
estate increased. Between early 1951 and early 1952 there was an
increased preference for savings accounts, but the proportion of spend-
61ing units favoring savings bonds declined further. Over the same period,
common stock continued to gain adherents but the gainwasslight.12
These shifts in saving flows and investment preferences may reflect,
apart from fears of inflation and stock market activity, dissatisfaction
with the fixed yields of savings bonds at a time when the general level
of interest rates was rising and, perhaps, expectations that these yields
would soon be raised. From early 1951 until the spring of 1952, capital
market yields were generally higher in relation to savings bond yields
than previously during the postwar period. Rates of return paid by
private financial institutions also were rising during the period. Net sales
of savings bonds did not recover until 1952, when their yields were
raised and current-income H bonds were introduced.
In contrast to earlier periods of declining net sales, when reductions
in the general level of saving strongly influenced cash flows into the
savings bond program, the $3.9 billion drop in net sales from $ —0.2
billion in 1955 to $—4.1 billion in 1957 appears to be due basically to
shifts in the composition of financial saving stemming from changes in
yield relationships. Total personal saving an& net additions to savings
accounts both increased from 1955 to 1957, gross financial
saving declined. Consumer purchases of durable goods increased from
1955 to 1957, but the rise was moderate.
During this period of tightening capital market conditions, yields
on alternative investments rose sharply in relation to savings bond yields.
Average effective rates of return paid by savings and loan associations
rose above yields at maturity of new issues of E and H bonds in 1956,
and remained above despite the increase in E- and H-bond yields, from
3.00 per cent to 3.25 per cent, in early 1957. Annual average yields on
marketable long-term Treasury bonds exceeded E- and H-bond yields
in 1956 and 1957 and exceeded the lower yield on J and K bonds through-
out the three-year period.
In response to the reduced attractiveness of savings bond yields,
individuals shifted from savings bonds to investment media whose
yields were more responsive to the general rise in interest rates. The
decline in net sales of savings bonds contrasted sharply with the in-
12See"Consumer Expectations as tdEconomicTrends and Consumer Investment
Preferences," Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1952, pp. 742-749, and "Income,
Selected Investments, and Short-term Debt of Consumers," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, September 1952, pp. 982-98g. NBER estimates of financial saving by
nonf arm households indicate that net acquisitions of common and preferred stock
increased from 1950 to 1952 (Table A-3).
62creases in other savings media, particularly net additions to savings
deposits in commercial banks and net purchases of certain types of
marketable investments (Table A-B) •13
Inpreceding periods of declining net sales, unmatured savings
bonds were held relatively firmly. In contrast, redemptions of un-
matured bonds rose sharply during 1955-57 (Table 12). This increase
stemmed from the sharp rise in yields on alternative investments, which
made switching from existing savings bonds into other forms of invest-
ment more profitable than during earlier periods.
As in the Korean War period, the decline in net sales was con-
centrated in F, G, J, and K bonds and in large-denomination E and H
bonds, while small-denomination E bonds were largely unaffected.
At the end of April 1957, the sale of J and K bonds was discontinued,
after purchases of these bonds had dropped to the vanishing point.
Sales of E and H bonds generally, and large denominations particularly,
were bolstered by changes in ownership provisions (Table A-i), which
tended to broaden the demand for these securities. Despite these
changes, however, net sales of E and H bonds in denominations of
$200 or more dropped by about $1.5 billion from 1955 to 1957. In
contrast, net sales of $10 to $100-denomination E bonds increased be-
tween 1955 and 1956 (reaching a postwar peak), and declined only
slightly in 1957, reflecting the approximately unchanged level of par-
ticipation in the payroll savings plan of about 8 million between mid-
1954 and mid-1957.14
Net sales of savings bonds declined once again in 1959 under the
influence of tightening capital markets, following the rise during the
1958 period of recession and financial ease. Despite the increase in
E- and H-bond yields, the competitive position of these bonds worsened
as yields on marketable securities soared to postwar peaks. Individuals
sharply increased their purchases of marketable securities, while they
reduced additions to holdings of savings accounts and savings bonds.
This shift in individuals' investment activity was dramatized by wide-
spread purchases of 5 per cent marketable Treasury notes ("magic
13Thesharp increase in net additions to savings accounts between 1955 and 1957
was concentrated in commercial banks, and reflected the sharp rise in rates of
interest on commercial bank time and savings deposits in 1957 following the
increase (effective January 1, 1957) in the maximum rates these banks were
permitted to pay on such deposits.
14AnnualReport, Treasury, various issues.
63fives"), accompanied by accumulation of liquid assets.15
Increased consumer spending for durables possibly also contributed
to rising redemptions. Total personal saving decreased, but financial
saving increased; this that changes in savings bond behavior
were related mainly to shifts in the allocation of saving rather than to
changes in total saving.16
As in the preceding period of tight money in 1956-57, the decline
in net sales was due mainly to increased In contrast to
the earlier period, however, the rise in redemptions was concentrated
in matured rather than unmatured bonds. Considering the magnitude
of the rise in market interest rates, redemptions of unmatured bonds
probably would have been substantially greater had the Treasury not
taken the step of increasing yields on outstanding E and H bonds as
well as on new issues. As inall postwar periods of declining net sales
after 1946, E and H bonds and F, C, J, and K bonds
(which were no longer available for purchase) were more severely
affected than E bonds. Redemptions of F and C
bonds reflected• a substantial amount of exchanges. forrn marketable
securities.'7
The course. of sales redemptions was reversed again in 1960.
Sales of E and H bonds increaSed and redemptions declined, reflecting
15 The offering of 5 per cent tour-year ten-month notes in October 1959 was one
of the few instances in recent years of substantial purchases by individuals of
an offering of marketable securities. Allotments to individuals (including
partnerships and personal trust accounts) of the "magic fives" amounted to $778
million of the total $2,316 million issued. Monthly data from the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and Association of Mutual Savings Banks indicate
that savings inflow into savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks
was substantially lower in October 1959 than in the corresponding period of the
preceding year. Net 'sales of E and H bonds showed a similar drop.
16 Flow-of-funds data compiled by the Federal. Reserve indicate that from 1958 to
1959 consumers (including trust accounts and nonprofit institutions)
sharply increased their net purchases of marketable securities, mainly Treasury
obligations, while they their new savings in time and savings deposits
in banks. Accumulation of savings and loan shares continued to increase in 1959,
but the rise was much in dollar terms than the fall in additions to bank
deposits. Gross financial (corresponding in general terms to the Federal
Reserve's "net. acquisition of financial assets") was higher in 1959 than in 1958.
(See Federal Reserve Bulletin', August 1961, p. 987.)
17 For amounts and issues involved, see note to Table A-4.
64an improved competitive position owing to the decline in capital market
yields relative to yields on E and H bonds which had been increased a
year earlier. Redemptions of F, G, J, and K bonds also declined. These
changes in savings bond flows were accompanied by increased accumu-
lation by individuals of other types of liquid assets and reduced purr
chasesof marketable securities.
Role of Yield Relationships
As indicated in the preceding section, the relative attractiveness of
yields on savings bonds has played an important role in determining
the course of savings bond flows. Yield relationships are important also
because they are subject, in some degree, to control by the Treasury.
To the extent that the market in which the program competes is im-
perfectly competitive and the competitors do not respond
immediately to changes in savings bond yields with adjustments of
their own, the Treasury may widen or narrow the gap between savings
bond yields and rates on alternative investments. At the same time, it
is clear from the postwar record that factors other than interest rate
relationships exert important influences on savings bond flows.
In Charts 7 and 8, the relative position of rates of return on savings
bonds and capital market investments is measured by the excess of
yields at maturity of new issues of savings bonds over the average yield
of marketable long-term United States government securities. This
comparison involves the assumption that investors consider mainly the
yield at maturity in choosing between savings bonds and alternative
marketable investments. While the much lower yields earned prior to
maturity undoubtedly are an important consideration in the choice
between savings bonds and alternative investments, investors probably
give the yield at maturity heavier weight. The yield at maturity is
emphasized in Treasury advertising, and some savers probably do not
know precisely what rates of return they will realize in the event that
they fail to hold their bonds until maturity. Moreover, in view of interest
penalties and other features that discourage liquidation prior to maturity,
many investors appear to regard savings bonds as long-term invest-
ments. This is suggested by the relatively long average "life" of E bonds.
In any case, to attempt to take into account the many rates of interest
realized at various points during the period to maturity would greatly




















































































































































































8NOTE TO CHABT 7
Data are monthly sales and redemptions; in terms of sales price, from Annual
Report, Treasury, and Treasury Bulletin, adjusted for seasonal variation by NBER.
Peaks insalesin June 1948 and fourth-quarter1950 reflect purchases by
institutional investors of special offerings. Sales of new J and K bonds were termi-
nated as of the end of April 1957. Peaks in redemptions during 1953-58 mainly
reflect maturities of F and C bonds.
Spread is excess of yields at maturity on new issues of C and K bonds (F- and
C-bond rates are closely similar, J- and K-bond rates are identical) over Federal
Reserve figures for yields on marketable United States government bonds maturing
Or callable after fifteen years, January 1946 to March 1952; after twelve years,
April 1952 to March 1953; and after ten yeáxs, April 1953 and thereafter. (See also
notes to Charts 2, 4, and 6.) P and T indicate peaks and troughs of NBER
reference cycles.
Additional qualifications are in order with respect to redemptions.
The most relevant 'yield is not the yield at maturity shown in the table
but the prospective yield on the outstanding .bond to be realized for the
remainder of the holding period. Here again, many different rates of
return are involved, depending on 'the length of the holding period,
which cannot be taken readily into account.18
During the early postwar years, changes in the spread between
yields of savings bonds and marketable bonds appear to have had little
effect on monthly seasonally adjusted sales and redemptions of E, 'F,
and G bonds)9 The yield spread was fairly stable, due to the main-
tenance of savings bond yields at constant levels and to rigid support
of prices of marketable Treasury security prices. At all times, yields at
maturity of all series exceeded long-term marketable bond yields. The
pattern of E-bond flows was dominated by the sharp decline in sales
and the rise in redemptions at theend of World War II. The subsequent
rise in sales and fall in redempt:ionsreflects the reassertion of the relative
attractiveness of savings bondsduririg this period of iow interest rates.
18should be noted, further, that data on marketable bonds used in this comparison
are for bonds whose terms to maturity are not uniform throughout the period
covered, and, in any event, differ from both the nominal maturities of savings
bonds and their average retention periods.
19a result of procedures adopted June 1954 by the Treasury .for processing
redeemed bonds, the relationship between the issue price and accrued interest
portions of the value of redeemed bonds is obscured. (See, for example,
Bulletin, July 1959, Table 4, N.5, p. 44.) Revised monthly figures, based on
changed methods of distributing redemptions between sales price and accrued




































































































































































































Data are monthly sales and redemptions, in terms of sales price, from Annual
Report, Treasury, and Treasury Bulletin, adjusted for seasonal variation by NBER.
Spread is excess of yields at maturity on new E and H bonds over marketable
bond yields (see note to Chart 7). E- and H-bond yields are rates prescribed at
time of offering and do not reflect revisions in yields on outstanding bonds made
in 1959 or retroactive application of increases in yields in April 1957 and September
1959 to bonds sold February-March 1957 and June-August 1959. (See also notes
to Charts 2, 4, and 6.) P and T indicate peaks and troughs of NBER reference
cycles. .
Salesof F and C bonds declined (except during special, offerings in
1948 and 1950), despite the stable yield spread, possibly as a result of
reduced demand for these bonds, as issues of corporate bonds and
other higher-yield investments became more plentiful after the end
of World War II. Redemptions of F and C bonds rose gradually, owing
to the relatively stable rate of attrition of the growing outstanding
amount of these securities.
As indicated earlier,.the Federal Reserve-Treasury accord heralded
basic changes ,in the level and, stability of yield differentials and in the
responsiveness of savings bond flows. Since the accord, the yield spread
has been lower than, during t.he early postwar period. It also has been
more variable, as marketable bond yields fluctuated sharply above and
below yields at maturity of savIngs bonds. Reflecting basic differences
in behavior among the various series, the response of sales of E and H
bonds differed markedly from that of F, C, J, and K bonds. Sales of
F, C, J, and K bonds varied closely with changes in the spread between
their yields at maturity and the rate of, return on marketable Treasury
bonds. Sales of E and H bonds were not strongly associated with
changes in the yield spread until. 1956-60, when marketable bond 'yields
varied sharply above and below their yields at maturity. The weaker
response of E and H bonds reflects the influence of general changes in
the level of saving, the stabilizing effect of regular purchases through
the payroll savings plan, and the strong preference for nonmarketable
investments on the part Of many individuals. It also reflects the fact
that until 1956, E- and H-bond'rates always exceeded marketable bond
yields, with the result that they were more attractive than other series
at the peaks of variations in market interest rates.
Variations in redemptions of F, C, 'J, and K bonds since 1953 reflect
mainly the large amounts of maturities during that period. However,
it is clear from annual data that redemptions of unmatured bonds also
were affected by changes in yield relationships, increasing,, as might be
69expected, when marketable bond yields were relatively high, declining
when marketable bond yields were relatively low (Table A-4). Annual
redemptions of unmatured E and H bonds also tended to move inversely
to the yields spread, although they generally remained relatively stable.
E- and H-bond yields must also be compared with rates of return
paid by the main types of private financial institutions on savings de-
posits and share accounts, their closest competitors for individuals'
savings.20 During most of the postwar period, rates of return paid by
the main types of private financial intermediaries on savings deposits
and share accounts moved, closer to the generally higher yields on
savings bonds. The long-mn effect of the resulting decline in yield
spreads is evident when early postwar peaks in the ratio of the net
increase in E and H bonds to net additions to savings accounts are
compared with the much lower peaks of the 1950's (Chart 9).
While the relative position of yields on E and H bonds and rates of
return on savings accounts is of basic importance, it is evident that other
factors also significantly influence the relative rate of growth of E- and
H-bond holdings in the short run. The importance of factors other
than the yield spread is indicated by the contrast between the gradual
decline in the yield advantage of E and H bonds and jagged fluctuations
in their relative growth. The unique problem of adjustment to peace-
time conditions of the savings bond program and the subsequent revival
of E and H bonds during the early postwar period were indicated earlier.
The sharp declines in the relative growth of E bonds from during 1950-
51, 1956-57, and 1959 seem to indicate reduced demand on the part of
sophisticated individuals for savings bonds relative to savings accounts
during periods of rapid economic expansion and rising interest rates.
To express this conclusion differently, E and H bonds appear to have
been more vulnerable to rapid rises in yields on marketable securities
2OAgain, qualifications are in order. Data on savings bond yields refer to rates
realized at maturity, while figures for savi.ngs deposits and share accounts are
average effective rates of return paid by these institutions. Commercial bank
rates reflect the lower rates paid on time deposits other than savings deposits,
which presumably are not close alternatives to E and H bonds from the viewpoint
of individual investors. Moreover data on commercial bank time deposit flows
include net changes in holdings of partnerships and corporations, which were
barred from purchasing E and H bonds until 1958. Yield spreads are compared
with net changes in holdings because data on gross deposits and withdrawals
that are comparable to figures on sales and redemptions of savings bonds are not
available for all types of financial institutions. Annual data are used because of
the unavailability of figures on rates paid by intermediaries on a quarterly or
semi-annual basis.
70CHART 9
Relative Growth of E and H Bonds and Savings Accounts Compared with
Spread Between Yields at Maturity and Effective Rates of Return Paid
by Selected Types of Financial Institutions, 1945-60
Relative growth rates (rotio)
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Savings and Loan Associations
71NOTE TO CHART 9
Relative growth rates are ratios of net changes in E and H bonds outstanding
(including net accrued interest), derived from figures in Treasury Bulletin,to
net changes in time and savings deposits. (held by individuals, partnerships,
and corporations)incommercial banks, .savingsdepositsin mutual savings
banks, and share accounts in savings and loan associations, computed from 'data
compiled by .the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Negative values of these ratios
do not accurately reflect differences in relative growth among the three types of
institutions since the greater the savings gain.at.the institution (and the larger the
denominator of the ratio) the smaller the .absolute value of the ratio, but do reflect
decreases in the relative growth of E and H bonds compared with preceding years.
Yield spread is excess of yields at maturity of new issues of E and H bonds
over effective rates of return paid on savings accounts. E- and H-bond yields are
rates prescribed at time of offering, or those applying retroactively to bonds sold
during February-March 1957 and June-August 1959, following changes in rates
on new issues in April 1957 and September. 1959.: They do not reflect revisions in
yields on outstanding bonds made in 1959. E- and H-bond yields in 1952, 1957,
and 1959, when rates were raised, are averages weighted by the number of months
each rate applied. Rates on savings accounts are percentages of interest or dividend
payments to average amount of deposits or share accounts held during year by
insured commercial banks, member savings and loan associations of the Federal
Home Loan Bank System, all mutual savings banks, and are from Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and National
Association of Mutual Savings Banks.
than .have savings accounts. One possible factor was the expectation
that rates on new issues of savings bonds would soon be raised, resulting
in postponement of purchases. MoreOver, some investors may have
preferred to concentrate additions to liquid assets in savings accounts
at such times because they could reasonably expect that yields on these
accounts would be adjusted, upward should capital market yields con-
tinue to rise. Barring an increase in yields on outstanding issues such
as that occurring in 1959, a purchaser of an E or an H bond could look
forward to receiving no more than the rate stipulated in the contract
at the time the bond was purchased, regardless of the future course of
yields on alternative investments. Thus t.he long-term savings bond
contract may become less attractive to investors relative to flexible-
yield savings .accounts during periods of rising capital market yields,
just as it may gain in attractiveness during' periods of falling interest
rates.
The influence of rapidly changing capital market yields on the
relative growth of savings bonds and savings accounts is indicated also
by the rise in the relative growth of E and H bonds during 1958 and
1960, when capital market yields declined.
72Comparisons of yield differentials and the relative growth of savings
bond holdings are helpful not only in analyzing the past record of
savings bonds, but also in appraising Treasury policy with respect to
savings bond rates. Despite the fact that E- and H-bond yields at ma-
turity generally exceeded rates of return on savings accounts, holdings
of these, bonds increased at a modest pace in dollar terms during the
postwar period, and annual additions actually declined relative to the
accumulation of savings accounts. This suggests that many individuals
tend to prefer savings accounts to E and H bonds at prevailing yields,
probably because savings accounts. are regarded as more suitable for
liquidity purposes. It appears that yields at maturity of E and H bonds
must be set at or near the top of the range of rates paid on savings
accounts by the various types of private financial institutions, if holdings
of these bonds are to continue to grow even at the relatively slow pace
attained during the postwar period.
Savings Bonds During Postwar Business Cycles
Postwar E- and H-bond flows have not shown a strong association
with business cycle turning points during the postwar period. The
absence of a systematic response to business cycles reflects in part the
relative mildness of postwar cycles and the influence of unemployment
insurance and other factors that dampen fluctuations in personal income
and saving. E- and H-bond flows have also been relatively unresponsive
to cyclical changes in capital market yields during much of the period
covered by this paper.2' Cyclical stability of E-bond sales has been
fostered, furthermore, by regular purchases through payroll deductions
and by the Treasury's policy of conducting promotional campaigns in
both recession and prosperity.22
As indicated earlier, sales and redemptions of Series F and C bonds
showed no clear cyclical tendency during the early postwar period.
Since the Federal Reserve—Treasury accord, however, F-, C-, J-, and
K-bond flows have varied with changes in the spread between yields
at maturity and rates on marketable long-term Treasury bonds.
21Tothe extent that cyclical variations in gross financial saving are parallel to
fluctuations in capital market yields, their effects on net sales of savings bonds
tend to be offsetting. In a period of high interest rates, for example, increased
gross saving might be accompanied by a shift from savings bonds to marketable
securities.
22SeeAnnual Report, Treasury, 1949, p. 181; 1954, p. 157; and 1958, p. 167, for
accounts of intensified promotional efforts conducted during the 1948-49, 1953-54,
and 1957-58 recessions.
73TURNOVER OF SAVINGS BOND HOLDINGS
Savings bonds are readily convertible into cash at the option of the
holder at predetermined prices. The rate of. turnover of savings bonds,
however, has been, lower than might be. expected on the basis of their
near-money characteristics. From 1941 to 160, the average, ratio of
annual.redernptions of E bonds to amounts. outstanding was 0.13.23 On
the basis of this average rate. of redemption, it may be estimated that
E bonds have remained outstanding on the average, for close to eight
years. The turnoyer of E bonds has been substantially lower than that
of savings deposits and shares (Table 14) and, of course, much lower
than that of demand deposits.24 Turnover of F and C bonds, the other
series with which the Treasury has had extended experience, was, even
lower than that of E bonds until 1954 (Table 15).
The relatively low rate of turnover of .E bonds stems 'partly from
the low yields realized on savings bonds that are redeemed prior, to
maturity. The redemption-at-discount feature of G and K bonds and
the tax deferral provision of discount bonds also tend to reduce the
rate of turnover of savings bonds.
While. interest "penalties" may. retard investthent 'shifts, they
ably have little influence when consumers dissave for emergencies or
for major expenditures on durable goods, or where:the only alternative
means of obtaining cash. is borrowing. The prospective yield forgone
through redemption prior to maturity generally is considerably below
the cost of borrowing for most individuals.
Contrary to expectations held during World War II, the rate of
redemptions of E bonds did not, rise after the end of the war, despite
the greatly increased inducement to liquidate savings bonds arising
from the expanded supply of consumer goods following wartime short-
ages. Indeed, the rate of redemptions of Ebonds was lower during most
postwar years than during the late war years.
23Dataon turnover are ratios of redemptions, including accrued interest on redeemed
bonds, to averages of beginning- and end-of-year amounts outstanding. The
1941-80 ratio is an average of anuual ratios weighted by amounts outstanding.
24Incomparison, with a ratio of redemptions to amounts outstanding of 0.13 for
E bonds in 1960, rates of turnover of demand deposits, reported by the Federal
Reserve;were 60.0 in New York' City, 34.8 in 6 other centers, and 25.7 in 337
other reporting centers. .
74.TABLE 14
RA'rEs OF SELECTED SAVING MEDIA, 1948-60
Mutual









1948 n.a. .27 .28 .12
1949 .45 .25 .25 • .10
1950 .48 .27 .29 .11
1951 .46 .27 .29 .12
1952 .46 .25 .27 .12
1953 .46 .25 .28 .12
1954 .46 .25 .27 .12
1955 .47 .27 .29 .12
1956 .49 .26. .30 .12
1957 .48 .26 .30 .14
1958 n.a. .25 .28 .13
1959 n.a. .28 .30 .14
1960 n.a. .26 .29 .13
n.a.=Not available.
SouncE: American Bankers Association, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, National
Association of Mutual Savings Banks, and Table 15. Data on deposits
and share accounts are ratios of withdrawals to average amounts out-
standing. Figures for E bonds are ratios of redemptions, including accrued
interest, to average amounts outstanding.
There is wide diversity in turnover rates among the various series
of savings bonds, stemming partly from technical differences among the
series and partly from differences in the financial behavior of the
various types of investors. The turnover of E bonds generally has been
higher than that of other series, but more stable. It was lower than the
turnover of F and C bonds after 1954, however, as F- and G-bond re-
demptions rose sharply owing partly to maturities including exchanges
for marketable securities. There was no similar bulge in redemptions
of E bonds because of the success of the Treasury's efforts to persuade
individuals to continue to hold their E bonds beyond the initial
75TABLE 15
RATIOOF REDEMPTIONS TO AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING,
E, F, AND G BONDS, 1941-60




















































































SOURCE: Computedfrom data in Annual Report, Treasury, Treasury Bulletin.
Data are ratios of redemptions, including accrued interest, on redeemed
bonds to averages of beginning- and end-of-year amounts outstanding.
Both matured and unmatured bonds are included. See notes to Table A-4.
Data on F and C bonds for 1960 are estimated.
aLessthan .005.
maturity.25 E bonds also were less sensitive to the rise in interest
rates between 1955 and 1957 and in. 1959. These differences in turn-
over rates are paralleled by differences between H bonds, on the one
hand, and J and K bonds, on the other (Table 16).
25Ofthe $25.8billionof E bonds coming due between May 1951, when the first
E bonds matured, and June 1958, less than $11 billion were turned in for cash;
the balance of nearly $15 billion was held for an extended period (see Annual
Report, Treasury, 1958, p. 166).
76TABLE 16
RATIOOF REDEMPTIONS TO AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING,
H, J, K BONDS, 1953-60













1956 .05 .10 .07









1960 .05 .16 .14
SouncE: Annual Report, Treasury, and Treasury Bulletin. Data are ratios of
redemptions, including accrued interest, on redeemed bonds to averages
of beginning- and end-of-year outstandings. Data on J and K bonds for
1960 are estimated.
The generally higher, but more rate of turnover of E bonds
probably reflects the effects of consumer dissaving for emergencies and
other types of expenditures that are not closely related to changes in
business activity or capital market conditions. Individual holders of
F and C bonds may not be prone to such dissaving or may make use of
other types of assets. Their rate of redemptions seems to be governed
mainly by changes in the attractiveness of shifts to other types of in-
vestments. The higher E-bond rate of redemptions is also attributable
to the fact that E bonds may be liquidated without notice, while one
month's written notice is required prior to redemption of all other series
sold during the postwar period.
Diversity among the various series with respect to redemption
behavior is indicated also by the fact that a much larger proportion of
E bonds has been liquidated shortly after being purchased than F and
G bonds. About one-fifth to one-third of E bonds issued each year from
1946 to 1958 was redeemed within one year, in contrast with only
2 to 6 per cent of F and C bonds.
Redemption behavior also varies among different holders and
denominations of E bonds. While many investors have liquidated their













E Bonds Redeemed Within One Year After Issue Date,
by Selected Denominations, 1941-58
NoTE: Data are proportions of the value of bonds originally sold in indicated
calendar years which were redeemed (including redemptions of bond reissued as
a result of partial redemptions) before July 1 of the next calendar year. Sales and
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'48 '50 '52 '54 '56 '58held their bonds for much longer periods of time: $17.5 billion, repre-
senting 47 per cent of the total redemption value of E bonds outstanding
at mid-1960, had been outstanding for more than the original ten-year
maturity period.26 As Chart 10 shows, the rate of redemptions of E bonds
within one year has been greater for$25E bonds than for higher
denominations.27 Similar, although less pronounced, differences in rates
of early redemption exist among denominations in bonds of other series.28
26 Annual Report, Treasury, 1960,p. 39.
27 One possible reason why small-denomination bonds are cashed in more fre-
quently may be that some investors desire to avoid partial redemption of higher-
denomination bonds, or may be ignorant of the fact that partial redemption of
larger denominations is permitted. An individual holding various denominations,
therefore, may prefer to redeem the smaller ones.
28 Annual Report, Treasury, 1958, pp. 32, 556-562.
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